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The Collaborative Craft of Creatural Writing 
Alex Lockwood 
Dear Anton,  
You are one day old. You are 1/180th of the way through your life. It will not be a 
good life. I wish I could write that the beginning (the tail docking, the castration) and 
end (no, not yet) will be the worst moments; that there will be respite, even comfort. 
But this is not a fairy story. Standard farming practices will meet only your very basic 
needs and these only to satisfy profit motives; those who own you will not respond to 
your piggish ‘wants.’ In too many ways you will only ever be –ish, never pig 
complete; the intensive processing to which your creaturely life is object rests upon 
what Nicole Shukin calls a “breaking” and a “denial of ‘becomings’” (2009, 31) 
where you are kept in a “limbo economy of interminable survival” where “coping is 
all” (39). I don’t know what ‘coping is all’ means in your hermetic context. The “with” 
with which you are becoming –ish is a with/out, including freedom and creatureliness, 
and the relationship between the two denied you. This becoming with/out leans on 
Donna Haraway’s provocation that “becoming is always becoming with, in a contact 
zone where the outcome, where who is in the world, is at stake” (2008, 244, emphasis 
in original).  
Your with/out, Anton, in Anat Pick’s words, is an “exemplary ‘state of exception’ 
of species sovereignty” (2001, 15). For Pick, whose theorization of creaturely poetics 
has done much to raise questions of your status, “to speak of animals’ vulnerability is 
to draw attention to their outstanding position in the judicial, political and moral 
orders” (15) of social worlds. But so what? What can we do? 
I have shed many tears for you in your shed. For you and your mother ‘gestating’ 
in her crate, the metal bars of her stall stalling her ability to come to you when you 
 2 
call, as if she has fallen inside the rutted grid of a steel volcano that plunges 
interminably to hell (those deep red lights, in fact, are to keep you safe from 
‘chilling’). I attempt to share your trauma by writing (in)to you, become traumatized 
by imagining your becoming with/out freedom. Like Haraway, the sociologist Kate 
Wright uses ‘becoming’ in the sense of the performative “becoming-with” which she 
describes as “a form of worlding which opens up the frames of what registers to us 
and so what matters to us” (2014, 279). It matters to understand what it means for 
creatural writing to imagine a becoming-with/out freedom. As Susan McHugh asks in 
her work on agency and Animal Farm, “what exactly goes on in the acts of reading 
and writing animals?” (2009, 32). What does it mean to write in a creatural way? One 
way we are going to find out is by doing it: as Robert McKay suggests, there is 
possibility in telling stories differently with nonhuman-centred agency through the 
introduction of what McHugh summarizes in McKay’s work as “a simultaneously 
abject, animal and ‘protesting agency’ that puts authority under erasure” (McHugh 
2009, 35). And why not scholarly stories? By writing (in)to you, I am hoping to bring 
this erasure to bear here. Following the autoethnographic method of, among others, 
Enza Gandolfo (2014), I write in a way that attempts to perform the creatural. In 
acknowledging our entanglement—if your end is already written, then so is mine 
(Lockwood 2016, 63)—I come closer to your trauma. But how? What is the craft? 
What are the consequences of traumatic fiction about the vulnerability of other 
creatures? What does it mean for our entanglement?  
Donald Turner has suggested “if a nonhuman animal’s story is to be told or heard, 
this will require a different type of listening than that to which humans are 
accustomed” (2003, 172). Cary Wolfe seems to agree. For him,  
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real “listening” means being willing to have our own modes of perception, our 
own habits of knowledge, our own prerogatives of power, interrogated by taking 
seriously the radical alterity of other, nonhuman, ways of being in the world, 
ways that demonstrably can be communicated to us, and are all the time, if we 
know how to listen. (2011, 103)  
 
I hope those who read on will turn their ears not into purses but to an otobiography 
nonhuman enough to put up with my attempts at becoming-with the other. 
I have conducted in-depth interviews with seven writer-editors of creatural work, 
who give attention to the nonhuman to produce this new listening, which is a listening 
that interrogates place, power and language. Their acts of writing offer resistance to 
the social and cultural energy expended in the history of contemporary Western life to 
expunge the creatureliness from us, through what Foucault has called a “radical 
malice of knowledge” (1994, 11) in the instrumentalization of our discourses and 
practices. Instead, theirs is a work of attention to Wolfe’s ‘radical alterity of other, 
nonhuman, ways of being in the world’. Looking to the production of creatural 
becomings will, I hope, lead us to the affective dimensions of a creaturely writing 
process. As Gandolfo suggests, this might be traumatic: “In order to create believable 
worlds that readers can inhabit and the characters that people them, writers have to 
inhabit their characters’ lives. This can mean spending years in dark places” (1). And 
as Paul Kingsnorth, author of The Wake, said during our conversation, “People are 
scared of talking about dark things.” My own writing, here and elsewhere, is an 
attempt to inhabit the dark places where you are, where “coping is all.” Poet Susan 
Richardson told me that the obligation to at least try is upon us. So I shed my human 
skin to get closer to yours. I wander and wonder into dark places, sniffing around the 
foundations of your unfreedom in the shed where you are kept, snuffling new forms 
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of narrating, digging into an attentiveness to the creatureliness of writing. I wish I 
could do more. But what else can I do? You are one day old. And there are a billion of 
you. 
 
How to Listen Differently 
It makes sense, Anton, if I first introduce you to a few texts in which writers have 
imagined human–nonhuman entanglements in ways that seem creatural. I’ve focused 
on the pig, or boar, or swine; you have been called many things: you have stood for 
chauvinism, stubbornness, and cruelty, as well as slovenliness, filth and 
intemperance—all undeserved markers. But your species define, as historians Robert 
Malcolmson and Stephanos Mastoris put it, “a boundary between the civilized and 
uncivilized, the refined and the unrefined” (2001, 2). Peter Stallybrass and Allon 
White have written that before intensive animal agriculture put you into those 
warehouses and crates, you were kept on smallholdings, even in the home, fed on 
swill and scraps. Imagine that! We could cohabit; you would be again the “creature of 
the threshold” that, they say, “overlapped with, and confusingly debased, human 
habitat and diet alike. Its mode of life was not different from, but alarmingly 
imbricated with, the forms of life which betokened civility” (1986, 47). (My apologies 
for their ‘its’. Perhaps they are working from Erica Fudge’s urge to write not history 
but “itstory” as “an attempt to identify the limits that our own discourses and our own 
capacities place on our ability to recognize agents with particular modes of 
engagement with the world” (2015, 19). Your historical closeness to us, your 
established intelligence and perhaps even the pinkness of your skin, have left you 
with, as McHugh says, “peculiar cultural resonances as avatars of animal agency in a 
startlingly coherent narrative history of barnyard revolutions. […] Pig stories come to 
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embody creative potentials for collective life” (2011, 18). It is this potential for 
collective life I am writing, Anton. To explore what it might be to write-with you: a 
becoming-with your lived experience.  
How has this collaboration formed? My practice has involved writing to you each 
day in my journal, a letter about your life. For material, I’ve turned to farming 
manuals, videos online, and my own experiences protesting outside the gates of 
slaughterhouses where I met your brothers and sisters suffering in trucks only minutes 
from the gas chamber. Over the first twelve days of my practice and of your life, 
much has happened. None of it good—except that you are alive, unlike some of your 
sisters and brothers. You are weaned away from your mother. You will never see her 
again. I skulk into your pen to feel your confusion, the aches of the castration and the 
tags bitten into your ears, and the terror of foods that make you sick (but so big 
already!). When Fudge says of Sandra Swart’s observation that “it was necessary for 
humans to think like a horse—to a certain extent—in domesticating them, training 
them, riding them” (Swart 2010, 256), then “perhaps this mode of engagement might 
be taken into the writing” (Fudge 2015, 18) of both the history and contemporary 
experience of nonhuman others. For Fudge and Swart this is an exercise of “historical 
empathy” (Swart 2010, 263). What I suggest is that perhaps a quest to write such a 
history is also the quest(ion) of writing creaturely.  
I have turned to piggish texts, Anton, as a way of coming closer to you. In 
Creaturely Poetics, Anat Pick gives welcome attention to this peculiar and powerful 
place of your kin in thinking the process of what creaturely writing may be. Let’s turn 
to Marie Darrieussecq’s Pig Tales whom Pick picks at, as if a player of the 
Schweineorgel (the swine organ: a harmonium) making beautiful notes of your 
creatureliness for the ear that is listening differently. In Darrieussecq’s novel Pig 
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Tales, the unnamed narrator, a woman whose body turns into that of a sow like your 
mother, experiences what it is to become you/her, performing a metamorphic 
becoming-with. Her perceptual experience of the world and herself changes. The 
more the narrator becomes a sow, the greater is her attention to her worldly 
entanglements: “The air, the birds—I don’t know, whatever nature was left—really 
affected me all of a sudden” (Darrieussecq 1997, 10). Later on, when more fully in 
pig form and wild in the forest, she forgoes all human concerns:  
I no longer remembered either the millennium to come or any of my 
experiences—everything rolled up into a ball inside me and I forgot it 
all. I lost my memory, I have no idea for how long. I ate and ate. . . . 
Eating and sleeping didn’t require much effort, just a little vital force, 
and there was enough of that in my sow’s brain and vulva and brawn 
to wallow through life. . . . With my entire body I felt once again the 
spinning of the planet. (127) 
 
The writer has imagined a pig who is in all of her pigness, and experiencing what you 
do not—acorns, mud, freedom. When the narrator becomes upset by the threat of 
“leaving my lair,” it is her body that responds: she becomes more pig, or rather, “I 
was naturally rather upset the day we moved, so I was a complete pig” (121, my 
emphasis). The narrator experiences the full extent of her affective life in her animal 
body. This implies that we humans can attain more complete lives when we feel 
ourselves as embodied creatures, the full range of our “mind–body–world 
entanglements” (Blackman 2008, 3) with the other. But the things of culture lead us 
away from our bodies. These are in Pig Tales most notably acts of reading and 
writing, and here lies one of the difficulties in not only coming close to you, but in 
understanding what creatural writing might be. 
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As Pick says, “Pig Tales begins by making the relationship between species and 
writing one of its chief concerns” (2011, 84). From the beginning, the narrator 
consciously draws attention to the process of recording her story in what the English 
translation terms “piggle-squiggles” (Darrieussecq 1997, 1) or “écriture de cochon” in 
the original—the writing by/for pigs. The narrator is also writing as a pig: with 
difficulty, for example, holding the pen in her trotter. The term ‘écriture de cochon’ 
resonates with “écriture féminine,” the term coined by Hélène Cixous in The Laugh of 
the Medusa, meaning ‘feminine writing’ that also opens to the inscription of the 
female body and female difference of language and text. By toying with this idea, 
Darrieussecq has written a book, says Pick, “about a certain animality of writing that 
exceeds the stakes of the female writer” (2011, 81, emphasis in original). That is, the 
idea of an “écriture de cochon” of writing by and for a pig reveals the naturalized 
ways in which writing/language supports and perpetuates dominant norms. Such 
“piggle-squiggles” from a sow/woman expose the ways in which both female and 
animal bodies are inscribed with difference through language and text, at their 
subordination and expense. To have another species—the pig, a sow—‘become’ a 
writer, experience a ‘becoming-with’ writing, challenges the idea, at least in the text, 
that only humans write. If only humans write, then language can be part of what it 
means to be human. For Pick, “the process of ‘becoming-human’ [is] for Darrieussecq 
inseparable from the question of writing” (85). To ask the question of the relationship 
between species and writing is then to expose and explore the ‘writing of species’. It 
is to suggest that the differences between species are merely written; are merely, then, 
a question of language, and not something natural at all. 
The writing of species is not always ‘creatural’ but can rub out the nonhuman in 
this privileged account of writing as only human. Human privilege—manifested in 
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anthropocentrism and speciesism—is enacted in practices that efface our separation 
from ‘becoming-with’ the animal other. Although, as Kate Wright suggests, “we can 
never disconnect from Earth’s ecological community, because we are always 
becoming-with, in a living multispecies world composed of phenomena and 
transitions” we can nevertheless “terribly damage our ability to respond to that world” 
(2014, 280). The civilizing process produces seemingly stable, autonomous, bound 
and single identities. But civilizing is also traumatizing; we are no such things as 
stable, autonomous and bound individuals. Seeing and believing ourselves to be so, 
we suffer all sorts of atomization and pathology as we move away from the things we 
most need: touch, somatic and physical regulation, organicity and symbiosis with our 
environments and others. What we require to flourish is to experience life with our 
vulnerable bodies. We must do so without “perceiving the body with consolatory 
illusions” (Pick 2011, 186). These comforting illusions of the mind (‘thinking’) are 
that we operate as autonomous, separate, nonmaterial and invulnerable beings, and 
cannot be threatened by the material, animal world. 
In the 2014 novel The Awareness, Gene Stone and co-author Jon Doyle chose 
four protagonists to tell the story of the world’s nonhuman population coming to 
conscious awareness of their exploited positions: a wild bear, a domesticated dog, a 
circus elephant, and, for the farmed animal population, pig number 323. This pair of 
authors have chosen to come close to the sense of what it might mean to feel the 
world through your senses (or rather, your mother’s), recoiling from the 
anthropocentric objectifying practices in the general narrative of your kind. 
When she comes to awareness, Pig 323 is trapped inside a pen (much could be 
said of this!). She begins to have disorienting thoughts and to discover language: 
“Pig,” she said as she caught herself. 
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The word felt good as it escaped her mouth into the air. 
. . . 
And then she thought of one word: “Human.” But the word wafted away like a 
secret… (Stone and Doyle 2014, 41-43) 
 
Can animals keep secrets? This is the subject of a meditation by Derrida in his essay 
‘How to Avoid Speaking: Denials’. For Pig 323 it is difficult to grasp, this secret of 
the human, of being (with the) human, but give her some credit, she’s only just gained 
awareness of this division in language. For Derrida, it is a “naïve philosophy” to 
suggest “animals are incapable of keeping or even having a secret” (1989, 17-18). 
And yet even as Pig 323 loses the word (“human”) she gains another (“secret”) and so 
both loses and keeps the secret of how secrets operate: through and as language. It is 
later, in the house of the absented humans, that Pig 323 learns—from a drunk and 
miserable ferret—what this word (“human”) means and so loses her secret but gains 
knowledge of the radical malice that humans have inflicted upon ‘farmed’ animals: 
“Why are you telling us all this?” 323 asked him. 
“Because you need to know. They have kept you so ignorant, that even the 
awareness hasn’t brought you to understanding.” 
Again, 323 felt the need to defend herself. 
“Who is this ‘they’ you keep speaking of? And how have they kept us from 
anything?” 
The ferret just laughed. 
“Quit laughing,” 323 demanded, rage rising within. “I said, quit laughing or I 
will make my way up there and stop your laughter myself.” 
The ferret quieted. He looked down into the eyes of 323. 
“Humans.” 
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“I knew it,” 323 said quietly. (Stone and Doyle 2014, 85-86) 
 
In Foucault’s analysis, there are three passions or drives that are “all ways not of 
getting close to the object or identifying with it but, on the contrary, of keeping the 
object at a distance, differentiating oneself from it or marking one’s separation from it, 
protecting oneself from it” (1994, 11). These passions are to lament, to detest, and to 
laugh. The ferret here is the stand-in for the absent human, both animal and not-
animal, drunk on fermented plums and detesting but also helping Pig 323 understand 
her predicament through explaining to her what she “needs to know” which is that “at 
the root of knowledge” are these drives, which “have in common a distancing of the 
object, a will to remove oneself from it and to remove it at the same time – a will, 
finally, to destroy it” (11). It is by quieting the detesting, objectifying laughter of the 
ferret that Pig 323 comes to understand the ‘radical malice of knowledge’ in the 
summation of the single word: ‘Humans’. Human-like consciousness, the ‘awareness’ 
that has come about like a global telepathic download, is not enough. Pig 323 needs to 
also be educated in the cultural behaviours of humans. At first glance it seems this 
access to knowledge takes place from animal to animal, ferret to pig. But the human is 
not wholly absent. We, the readers, are also implicated in this scene. We recognize 
some aspect of ourselves in the ferret’s drunken laughter and, critically, this draws us 
to the creatural writing-with at play in the text.  
By choosing to inhabit Pig 323’s world in narrative, Stone and Doyle are hinting 
towards the creatural as requiring the opposite of this ‘keeping the object at a distance’ 
by either laughing at, lamenting or detesting. Instead, what is needed is to listen, 
differently. Towards the end of The Awareness, Pig 323 is led to a shed where 
hundreds of sows are trapped inside gestation crates, many of them farrowing or with 
young piglets like you, Anton. Pig 323 frees the others from their crates and urges 
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them out before fire engulfs the shed. Outside, the pigs from the original pen come 
and join those newly rescued: 
Here were their mothers, they learned, and they nudged each other, and talked, 
and sniffed, and wondered who belonged to whom, and why that suddenly 
seemed to matter. . . . They spoke of their next round of piglets, how they’d be 
born into something different than any of the rest of them. They thanked 323, 
over and over. . . . The other pigs asked her how she did it, how she was able 
to free the birthing pigs. 
“I used my mind,” she said. “My body. And my hooves.” 
They all looked at their own bodies and hooves, and wondered what they 
would have done. Then they asked her to tell the story again and again. 
(Stone and Doyle 2014, 192-193) 
 
By bringing our attention here to the nonhuman telling of stories, by asking us to 
understand that they matter, and hear the voices of other animals, Pig Tales and The 
Awareness engage in attempts to have us ‘listen differently’ to the narratives we 
humans create—and co-create—about the nonhuman. Following McHugh, we might 
argue that these two novels are efforts to wrest away particular nonhuman agency 
from the human-centred practices of literature, as alternative “models of collectivity” 
(2011, 22). That is, “commitments to living with and learning from animals 
differently . . . can proceed from creative engagements with narrative forms” (217).  
McHugh is talking here of literary representation; but what about the creation of 
these forms? If these novels are to be seen as “experiments with multiple perspectives 
and processes that support models centred on agency rather than subjectivity” (1) and 
as such produce writing about creatures that is also creatural, how is this enacted in 
the production? If writers are “to write the body of the traumatized character, its 
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visceral qualities, the writer must know it” (Gandolfo 2014, 9). Perhaps unwittingly, 
Gandolfo reduces the subject of history to an impersonal body, the ‘it’; but that is 
fitting for how most writers (and critics) overlook the importance of nonhuman 
experience, testimony, and bodily encounter in their writing. But what about writers 
who do respond to their entanglements with the world, the nonhuman other? In what 
ways is creatural writing performed? 
 
Writing in Creatural Ways 
Anton, you are now forty-five days old. If you were a broiler chicken you would be 
dead. You are coping, you are alive, you know nothing else. With such a lack of 
stimulation, only my rendering of literary tales keeps you from going insane. But you 
continue to shape my scholarly writing; I engage with the seen and heard 
representations of your experience, if not the smells and visceral touches, so that my 
writing, I hope, “twists language, makes it vibrate, seizes hold of it, and rends it in 
order to wrest the percept from perceptions, the affect from affections, the sensation 
from opinion” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 176). And I might add, in your context, 
wresting the rending from rendering, reared as you are for and as meat. 
I hazard a guess that to produce creatural writing is to do with attempts to read 
and write your experience with empathy, an emotion that the philosopher Lori Gruen 
thinks of as “a particular type of attention[,] . . . a kind of moral perception” (2015, 
39). For Gruen empathy is “the ability to blend emotion and cognition to understand 
the situation of the other” (51). If writing is a form of thinking or rather an exploration 
“to find out what I’m thinking” (Didion 1980, 18), then the ‘ability to blend emotion 
and cognition’ can be found in the writing process, as we come as close as we can, as 
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Leo Tolstoy impels us, to the other—to you—as close as we can bear, to help and to 
care. 
A few caveats, however. For Belgian ethologist Vinciane Despret, empathy is too 
narrow: “Certainly, empathy transforms the subject (the one who feels empathy) but 
this transformation is a very local one as long as it does not really give [the 
empathiser’s] object the chance to be activated as subject, the subject feeling empathy 
remaining the subject of the whole thing” (quoted in Fudge 2015, 21). For Despret, 
“Empathy allows us to talk about what it is to be (like) the other, but does not raise 
the question “what is it to be ‘with’ the other” (Despret 2004, 128). Physically, 
perhaps, this is the case. I am not there, with you. 
Philosopher Ralph Acampora also veers away from both empathy and sympathy, 
suggesting they are “more airy, psychic” notions that do not provide a satisfactory 
sense of dense physical experience. What Acampora wishes to avoid is to employ 
empathy as “an ontology that grants the presence already of subject/object division 
and subject/subject separation” (2006, 78). Instead, Acampora suggests “it is time, as 
it were, to put the body back into moral sense” (73) and his attempt to do so is to 
work with the concept of “symphysis” as an “experiential principle of conviviality” 
(78) between bodies, and which places much more emphasis on the corporal 
component of how we sense and make sense of others. Symphysis is much more 
useful and responsible a concept than empathy, in Acampora’s argument, for 
exploring interspecies compassion and how we encounter and form relations at the 
somatic level: through bodily engagement.  
Both Despret and Acampora offer useful reappraisals of the concept of empathy 
as raised already in this chapter in respect of a ‘becoming-with’ writing or even a 
‘writing-with’. However, rather than adopting symphysis at this stage, I will continue 
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to employ the concepts of empathy and compassion as reasonably understood to 
ensure the focus is instead on elucidating this new concept: the creatural. As such, I 
need to ask what else is happening in the practices of writers that makes me believe 
they are engaged in performances of creatural craft that remain ‘with’ the other? 
Over the summer of 2015 I visited seven writers to ask how they write in 
creatural ways—about the human as animal, the nonhuman animal, the animate and 
inanimate. They let me into their body–world–mind entanglements around their 
writing processes that, in my view of their work, tries to create “a syntax that makes 
[their work] pass into sensation, that makes the standard language stammer, tremble, 
cry, or even sing” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 176). Let me introduce them, with the 
caveat that some still would eat you. (While ethical veganism forms part of my 
utopian creative process, in the sense of Ann Cvetkovich’s “utopia of ordinary habits” 
(2012, 191) that includes writing and other embodied routines, this does not hold for 
all others engaged with creatural practices. Becoming-with is a messy business.) 
These writers have a connection to projects, publications and ways of being that 
coalesce into what can perhaps be called, in Blanchot’s (1995) terms, a writing of the 
disaster of modern Western ways of living. Sharon Blackie is a novelist, nonfiction 
author and the founder and co-editor of Earthlines magazine, which seeks to “tell the 
story of those who are living well” in these times of ecological crises and species 
extinctions. David Knowles is co-editor of Earthlines and a poet “who likes animal- 
more than human company.” Susan Richardson is another poet with three published 
collections, her latest being skindancing, which explores human–animal ambiguities 
and troubles those categories through shape-shifting forms and expressions, 
especially—as do both Sharon and David—drawing on Celtic myth and story. Along 
with James Roberts, the author of the children’s book The Man in the Mountain, a tale 
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of the loss of wild life, Susan co-edits Zoomorphic, an online magazine dedicated to 
“the defense and celebration of animals.” Another writer engaged with attempting to 
undo the damage done by the mostly anthropocentric outlook of ‘civilization’ is poet 
and psychologist Steve Thorp, who established Unpsychology magazine as a place for 
writing about “the wild mind.” The fourth project is Dark Mountain, founded by 
Booker-longlisted novelist Paul Kingsnorth (with Dougald Hine). I travelled to 
Ireland to visit Paul and talk about his novel The Wake as well as his nonfiction, 
including Real England, and the Dark Mountain project that now publishes 
anthologies around, loosely, the idea of “Uncivilisation.” On the way I stopped off in 
Scotland to speak to Em Strang, a poet with her first collection coming out in 2016, 
and also poetry editor of Dark Mountain. I asked these writers how they inhabit 
language, and their bodies, in ways that try to undo the catastrophe. To understand the 
web of entanglements that we are in—which we must, if there is to be a future for 
(and not only beyond) us. 
 
Becoming Animal by Becoming-With Place  
“I’ve always loved animals,” Roberts begins. “I wanted to set up something that was 
purely about the animals, rather than with them in the periphery.” For Richardson, 
there is a strong feeling that “poetry and prose as well can be a very effective tool for 
creating new patterns of thoughts and experience, ultimately possibly engendering 
behaviour change” towards animals.  
All of the writers practiced coming closer to the nonhuman—and their own 
animality—by staying in one place and getting to know that place. Richardson feeds 
her poetic practice by “spending long periods of time where animals might be. I’m 
interested in being more rooted, spending a long time getting to know a small area 
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intimately. That’s really helped my writing about animals, because if I know a whole 
ecosystem or environment on an intimate level, it leads to depths in the writing that I 
couldn’t access before.” 
Each of the writers has chosen to live in places where they could, as Blackie 
emphasizes, “live with the land.” (Blackie’s forthcoming book is entitled If Women 
Rose Rooted.) This becoming-with the land is also vital to each of their publications’ 
editorial rubrics. As Knowles says of Earthlines: “It comes down to having ways of 
living that are the fabric of your life, rather than adding a bolt-on by going out into—
this is anathema to us—‘the countryside.’ What we’re looking for is people who are 
living in a way where the land is central to their whole way of life.” 
For Kingsnorth, rootedness is a condition that has opened up possibility in his 
writing practice. He and his family moved to rural Ireland to live with a larger patch 
of land than they could afford in England. Kingsnorth writes from a hut on the land 
away from the house that was, while I stayed over, observed by a wild horse in the 
field beyond. The idea of rootedness is evident in The Wake, which retells the story of 
the Norman Conquest in 1066 from the point of view of the ‘green man’ Buccmaster 
of Holland, thrown off the land by the invading French. Finding rootedness is, for 
Kingsnorth, part of the solution to the current ecological and biodiversity crises. 
“When people are rooted,” he suggests,  
it’s not something they particularly worry about, it’s not a Romantic idea for 
them. But for those of us floating around in bourgeois consumer capitalism, 
we’re now coming out of the other side of modernity and its promise that the 
individual is free from the mass. But that’s lead to the individual feeling rootless. 
 
Strang’s poetry is infused with a contextual becoming-with ‘animal’ and land. In 
a long poem she is currently writing,  
 17 
there’s a lot of deer, there’s not very many people, the guy is surviving on 
foraging, an ecological crisis has occurred, and there’s a lot of rain, a lot of bog, 
and scree. These images will always be there for me when talking about these 
crises. I’ve always been fascinated with nature, what we call that, it’s what makes 
my heart sing, being in the forest, going to the river, growing my own food. It 
will always be reflected in my poems. 
 
Strang and Richardson recall to me Sarah Wood’s comment that, “Poets do not 
hesitate to address animals, especially birds. Philosophers and scholars would not 
usually dare” (2013, 18). Or perhaps psychologists. For Thorp, in understanding 
animality it is important to note the difference between being ‘in’ or ‘with’ nature. As 
he says,  
We are human animals, and we have taken ourselves into a place where we are 
living in ways that is not nature. There’s a difference between “in” and “with” 
that we need to ask about how we are living. The “in” bit is how I recover—
going “in” to nature, but not necessarily being or becoming “with” it. It feels like 
I’m doing an “in” not a “with”; there’s no real relationship, and I like that—for 
recovery. 
 
The Importance of Story 
A common thread among the writers for practicing ‘creatural writing’ is a close, even 
moral, attending to the centrality of story for understanding human–nonhuman 
entanglements. “We can’t get away from stories,” says Strang, “they are part of us, 
they’re intrinsic. But unless we realize the power they have over us they can be 
phenomenally dangerous.” 
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For Blackie, the challenge of the writer is to frame the experience of what is 
being harmed in a way for the reader to come upon it that connects empathically to 
their loss. Often the stories that best touch upon these losses in ways that can be felt 
and acted upon are stories that engage nonhuman imagery and agency.  
“I work a lot with people who yearn for something,” says Blackie, who runs a 
women-only writing workshop, Singing Over the Bones.  
Women particularly are big yearners; they are yearning for something: a form of 
enchantment, a way of being that is in some way magical. A story that works 
every time is of the Selkie, the seal-woman who has her skin stolen. She fades 
away, but then finds her skin and gets back into it. It’s a perfect metaphor for 
people who know that there is some way of being in the world that they’ve lost, 
or that their ancestors had and they never had. The best stories are those that 
allow people to put their own experience into it. You capture that inchoate kind 
of longing for something, and you give it a form. 
 
(It is worth noting that for Linda Vance, the yearning for something lost is more 
typical an experience of male relations with nature, in that privileged, white men have 
the access and luxury to indulge in such an emotion. Perhaps what Blackie is 
suggesting is not yearning itself, but its suppression. As Vance says: “For women and 
people of color, that same separation means a continual struggle for access to that 
which defines and controls us” (Vance 1993, 124).) 
Both Richardson and Roberts have used this story in their writing. For 
Richardson this has taken on deeper meaning in relation to the seal, which I will come 
to in a moment. Kingsnorth echoes this sense of ‘yearning’ for something lost that 
appears in his practice, connected to what he argues as a loss of connection with the 
concept of what it means to be ‘English’, and the language that he created for his 
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novel. The Wake is written in what he calls a “kind of shadow language” that is a mix 
of old English, Anglo-Saxon and creatural becomings. He emphasizes this is not a 
“device” but an “essential, integral” element to communicate what it might have been 
like living a thousand years ago. The Wake is similar to William Golding’s The 
Inheritors, a retelling of the diminishment of Cro-Magnon man in prehistorical times, 
which Pick calls “a bold ecopoetic experiment that gives rise to a new kind of literary 
sentience” (2011, 53). The creatures of The Inheritors are pre-human; the playfulness 
in language, as with The Wake, is a question of “not species, but perception” (54). For 
Kingsnorth, the process is of exchanging our language for one appropriate to the 
mind–body–world entanglements of humans living a thousand years ago. “If you 
break down a language you break down the way that you visually relate to things,” he 
explains, “you’re being forced to look at the world in a different way through 
different words, and to observe the things your ancestors had but we do not—this 
connection with land, myth, gods, place, animals. To a degree that’s what every writer 
does anyway: how can you look at it fresh?” 
For Kingsnorth this articulates a way of being in the world, resonant of how Kate 
Wright’s uses Haraway’s “worlding” to show us how we are not in the world. It is 
freedom from the constraints of contemporary thought to rethink the creatural, what 
Sarah Wood means when she writes, “The articulation of an otherwise inconceivable 
concept can only be brought about by a work that does not think” (2013, 18). Or at 
least, not to think like us. 
 
Practices and Techniques 
For Richardson, a practice of education around the nonhuman world is a vital 
component in her creatural craft. “I try to get up to speed with the science as much as 
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possible,” she says, “whether that involves doing an animal behaviour course or doing 
a wild boar tracking day or an otter ecology day, or a week monitoring and counting 
seal pups in Pembrokeshire.” 
Richardson also has very clear techniques for engaging in creatural work. “If I’m 
writing from the animal’s perspective or trying to, I’ll think a lot about pronouns and 
not having a single solitary I.” Richardson’s practice echoes Derrida’s invocation that 
“We must be several in order to write, and even to ‘perceive’” (Derrida 1978, 226). “I 
maybe have a we, or an us,” continues Richardson (or even a you, Anton?), “if you’re 
writing about a flock for example, to think about how language is malleable and fluid 
and can shift.” 
Richardson, Knowles and Strang all play with “verbs acting as nouns, nouns as 
verbs, etc.” For Knowles,  
To some extent we’re talking about devices for getting around the ruts of 
language. But I think there are enough permutations in language, even the one we 
have which is so trodden down, which gives you something, every so often you 
come up with something, a curiousness, a surprise, which puts the reader into the 
place where you were, afresh, as it were. 
 
Richardson agrees. “Being open to language as more fluid, and thinking about the 
form of the poem and allowing that to shift and change, shift from prose to poetry and 
back again, having fluid sentence structure, brings us closer to the nonhuman, reminds 
us that language is constructed by humans. If we’re writing from an animal’s 
perspective,” she adds, “it’s going to be a construct anyway, but I like experimenting 
with different forms of structure to give a flavour of animalness, or my version of 
animalness where possible.” 
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This idea of how we perceive is central to Strang’s practice in moving closer to 
the nonhuman. “I’m interested in seeing our own seeing,” she explains.  
What does it mean to see and perceive the world? Paul Klee said it wasn’t him 
looking at the forest but the forest looking at him, and I feel that as well. It isn’t 
just a one-way thing, it isn’t energy from me going into the world; it’s a two way, 
cyclical exchange. 
 
Knowles writes from the same position.  
We’re presented with this notion that there’s us and the world out there, and it’s a 
false dualism. What I’m trying to do with my writing is to show that it’s a false 
dualism in the first place and that there’s only one great continuum and it is us 
and the land and the animals and the birds and the weather. It’s a real, tactile, rain 
in your face, glimpse of a fox, phenomenon. It’s gritty under your fingers, not 
some intellectual construct. This is the land on which you walk, footfall after 
footfall, glimpse after glimpse. 
 
This attention to perception has led Thorp, Strang and Kingsnorth to meditation 
and Buddhism, Richardson and Blackie to myth and folklore, and Richardson to the 
alterities of shamanism and trance. These are all forms of recognizing the other and 
rerouting the social mind’s responses in their writing to what could be called creatural. 
For Strang, meditation is similar to poetry in that “it’s a slowing down process—I 
have to think about what I’m writing; I’m not just cognating it, I’m emotionally 
engaged, I’m sensorially engaged, and all of those processes take time.” 
To come closer to animals, Richardson practices “dance and trance, and more 
intuitive stuff such as shamanic journeying, animal communication, which helps me 
find a more intuitive way into writing.”  
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Animal totems have significance for my writing. Some of my first shamanic work 
was about finding my animal spirit guide, and the one that came up was the 
Atlantic grey seal, and I think my relationship with Seal has developed a lot over 
the years. If you open yourself up to your spirit guide then it will appear to you in 
lots of different ways. I was more aware of Seal being there.” Such radically 
other ways of connecting with the nonhuman in writing is essential, thinks 
Richardson, for challenging the dominant stories we tell about nonhuman animals. 
“In our Western tradition there are very few examples of positive animal 
transformation. It’s often a curse. But in more traditional forms of stories it is 
seen as a positive transformation. For me this sums up the dysfunctional 
relationship we have not only with the animal within us but with the wider animal 
world. 
 
These attempts at self-transformation, of ‘becoming-with’ the/an animal, are 
crucial, says Blackie, for tackling the contemporary disasters of Western living, even 
if they are a risk. “You have to do something that runs the risk of transforming 
people,” she says.  
My own writing is very much about that. I don’t think I would write if I did not 
have anyone to communicate with. It’s the story that’s important. Reenchantment 
is a funny word, some people love it, some people hate it, but I go out into the 
world and see a crow and I know what a crow is and I know how it lives and I 
know what it sounds like. I know it’s a crow, but on top of that I have layers of 
mythology that date back to ‘this is what a crow was in mythological terms’ in 
this land. It doesn’t make it less of a crow it makes it more crow to me, and if we 
live more with these stories then we care more about crow and care more about 
the environment where crow is, and we see ourselves as part of crow not 
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something separate from crow. And so we change, we live differently, we don’t 
need crap, we don’t need the possessions we have—we just need crow. 
 
The Collaborative Nature of Creaturalness 
These attentive writers are engaged in what Thom van Dooren has called “practical 
acts of care that can draw others into a sense of curiosity and concern for our 
changing world” (2014, 293, emphasis in original). Van Dooren unpicks the affective, 
ethical and practical nature of the labor of caring. The investment in shamanism of 
Richardson, Roberts’ decision to live in a national park, the obligations these writers 
have put upon themselves to live with nonurban experiences of the nonhuman to 
infuse and shape their craft, are vital practices of the labor of caring; as are the 
publications they have established to foster community around human–nonhuman 
entanglements. Their writing is “grounded in a new way in the specificity of real 
bodies and worlds in ongoing relationship” (293). And, as Blackie emphasizes, these 
ongoing relationships are both social and textual: the crow is not just crow but the 
layers of story we know about crow. It is our obligation, in living well, to know these 
layers and articulate them in story. This is, van Dooren says, a “curious critique” that 
is exemplary of this new (but so very old) way of caring: “here the obligation to know 
more emerges as a demand for the deep contextual and critical knowledge about the 
object of our care, a knowledge that simultaneously places us at stake in the world 
and demands that we be held accountable” (293), practically. This articulates my hope, 
Anton, and my justification for this creatural scholarship, a writing that “requires that 
we get involved in some concrete way, that we do something (wherever possible) to 
take care of another” (292). This is to enter into (dialogue with) a forest of concepts 
that Nicholas Royle suggests could be termed an “animological discourse” (2013, 
187). For Royle, thinking through the ‘question of the animal’ and our entanglements 
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with specific animals is another way of thinking about “the sociality of writing as 
drama” (186, emphasis in original). Such sociality of becoming-with the other has, as 
Fudge continues, “implications for a concept of agency” (2015, 22) for both human 
and nonhuman; such a perspective foregrounds nonhumans as both “social and textual 
agents” (McHugh 2009, 24). 
Where Fudge has ‘itstory’ and Royle ‘animology’, what I propose—we 
propose—is that creatural writing is a practice of embodied and felt collaboration 
(with the land, with spirit guides) that leads to ‘asking better questions’ of the 
nonhuman experience and the human–animal relation. If we ask, as Sara Ruddick 
compels us to, not what rights you have, but, more directly “What are you going 
through?” (1980, 348) then the answers you provide give me a better sense of what 
my species is going through, entangled as we are. Creatural writing as a collaborative 
practice of writing the disaster. It is because these, and other, writers have an 
understanding of their entanglements—and responsibilities—that they invest their 
narrative practice with the ‘grit under the fingers’ habits of coming as close as they 
can to nonhuman agency, to pay moral attention in asking Ruddick’s question, and 
‘listening differently’ to the answers.  
In The Awareness, Pig 323 is told her name by another of her kin who reads the 
tag puncturing her ear. “323? Yes, she thought, good. The digits belonged to her, like 
her hoof, like her stout legs. Amid the pen of replicas, she owned something unique” 
(Stone and Doyle 2014, 43). There is much here to say—too much in fact, a whole 
chapter on these ‘digits’ that are numerical and hint towards the opposable thumb; of 
the ‘pen of replicas’ that are both her kin and the writing machine. But let me 
concentrate on naming. By naming you Anton, I have, like the authors of The 
Awareness, understood that to name you is to make you subject to the law of proper 
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nouns. Why Anton? A serendipitous name. Antonomasia is the practice of the 
substitution of a phrase for a proper name, such as “the little corporal” for Napoleon 
(Bonaparte, not Napoleon in Animal Farm). By calling you Anton, this reverses and 
brings attention to the process of naming, a task we save for ourselves as humans. The 
noun proper to you inside industrial agriculture is pig. Nothing else. To call you 
Anton is to name you otherwise, to highlight this naming as a gesture in language that 
attempts, at least metonymically, to place you properly. Antonomasia is a gesture that 
fails if we save it for ourselves, like so many other failures when it comes to our 
species relationships.  
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